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The Ties That Bind Us
Ritual, Fusion, and Identification
by Harvey Whitehouse and Jonathan A. Lanman
Most social scientists endorse some version of the claim that participating in collective rituals promotes social
cohesion. The systematic testing and evaluation of this claim, however, has been prevented by a lack of precision
regarding the nature of both “ritual” and “social cohesion” as well as a lack of integration between the theories and
findings of the social and evolutionary sciences. By directly addressing these challenges, we argue that a systematic
investigation and evaluation of the claim that ritual promotes social cohesion is achievable. We present a general
and testable theory of the relationship between ritual, cohesion, and cooperation that more precisely connects
particular elements of “ritual,” such as causal opacity and emotional arousal, to two particular forms of “social
cohesion”: group identification and identity fusion. Further, we ground this theory in an evolutionary account of
why particular modes of ritual practice would be adaptive for societies with particular resource-acquisition strategies.
In setting out our conceptual framework, we report numerous ongoing investigations that test our hypotheses against
data from controlled psychological experiments as well as from the ethnographic, archaeological, and historical
records.
Social scientists have long appreciated that collective rituals
serve to bind groups together. The fourteenth-century scholar
Ibn Khaldu¯n referred to this as ‘asunderdotabı¯yah, which, roughly
translated from the Arabic, means “social cohesion” or “sol-
idarity” (Ibn Khaldu¯n 1958; Turchin 2006). Khaldu¯n believed
that ‘asunderdotabı¯yah was rooted in kinship but could be extended
to tribes and nations through the sharing of ritual and ide-
ology, a view that anticipates at a general level some of the
key arguments developed here. Pioneers of social theory in
the nineteenth century similarly accorded to ritual a pride of
place among the various cultural practices that promote ca-
maraderie and coalition formation (e.g., Durkheim 1995
[1912]; Frazer 1922; Fustel de Coulanges 1980; Robertson-
Smith 1889). This theme runs through the most important
works in social and cultural anthropology of the twentieth
century, amply illustrating the view that rituals bolster the
social order. A particularly influential idea was that it is the
social function of rituals to rejuvenate commitment to col-
lective goals and to ensure acquiescence to the will of the
group and deference to figures of authority (Kertzer 1988).
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This theme lay at the heart of not only the many varieties of
functionalist thinking (e.g., Malinowski 1944; Radcliffe-
Brown 1952) but also various forms of structuralism (e.g.,
Douglas 1970; Leach 1954), Marxism, and neo-Marxism (e.g.,
Bloch 2004; Sahlins 1974) and is even detectable in many
post-structuralist analyses of colonialism, alterity, and identity
(Comaroff and Comaroff 1993; Foucault 1975).
Arguably the most important legacy of this work is the
wealth of ethnographic description it has inspired, rather than
its contribution to scientific theory. As a consequence, we
now have a vast corpus of detailed accounts of rituals in
different cultural environments and of the patterns of group
formation and competition with which these rituals are as-
sociated. Unfortunately, such descriptions do not furnish us
with many precise and testable hypotheses concerning the
mechanisms allegedly connecting ritual participation with
particular forms and intensities of group cohesion and co-
operation, and for decades there was no systematic effort to
formulate and test hypotheses of this kind.
The situation, however, is beginning to improve. Progress
has recently been made on understanding ritual and coop-
eration by focusing on the effects of synchronized movement
(a common feature in collective rituals), costly signaling (rit-
uals often incur heavy costs in terms of material resources,
time, and physical effort or suffering), and displays of com-
mitment to particular belief systems (such as religious
traditions). Efforts to investigate the effects of synchrony on
in-group affiliation and commitment to communal goals have
focused on such behaviors as synchronous marching (Wil-
termuth and Heath 2009), rowing (Cohen et al. 2006), and
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musical performance (Tomasello 1999). A potentially com-
plementary line of research considers the possibility that rit-
uals inspire trust and cooperation by signaling commitment
to the group (Irons 2001; Sosis 2006). A somewhat similar
proposal is that rituals affect our cognitive tendency to believe
the pronouncements of others to the extent that they practice
what they preach. On this view, rituals serve as “credibility
enhancing displays” for the group ideologies underlying them
(Henrich 2009; Lanman 2012).
The hypotheses advanced by these new approaches have
prima facie plausibility, and efforts have been made to test
them scientifically, for instance using carefully controlled psy-
chological experiments (Wiltermuth and Heath 2009) and
economic games (Sosis and Ruffle 2003). Further, these efforts
demonstrate the need for and benefits of fractionating (Boyer
and Bergstrom 2008) the folk category “ritual” into distinct,
empirically tractable phenomena with particular effects on
cohesion and cooperation. Nevertheless, this work has not
applied the same rigorous procedures to the category of “co-
hesion” and has not yet become grounded in a more encom-
passing theory of the relationship between ritual, cohesion,
and cooperation. Why should synchrony lead people to af-
filiate or cooperate? Why should we regard ritual as a signal
of trustworthiness or conviction when we also know that there
are strong social pressures driving participation and often
sanctions for failure to participate in the proper fashion? Here
we are seeking a fuller explanation of ritual and cohesion that
encompasses but also goes significantly beyond the hypotheses
so far advanced, by fractionating “cohesion” alongside “ritual”
and situating what is currently known about these topics
within an overarching evolutionary framework.
Ritual
Anthropologists may be intrigued by the specific findings of
recent cognitive and evolutionary scientists, but unsure as to
how they help explain anything about “ritual” and its effects
on cohesion. Some rituals involve synchronous actions, but
a great many do not. Some rituals appear quite costly in terms
of time and effort, others much less so. Further, such work
seems to ignore anthropological scholarship in recent decades,
questioning whether “ritual” constitutes a stable object of
analysis in the first place (Asad 1993; Bell 1992; Humphrey
and Laidlaw 1994).
Like the categories “religion” (W. C. Smith 1962; J. Z. Smith
1998) and “kinship” (Needham 1971; Schneider 1984), “rit-
ual” is a folk category dragging along with it the baggage of
a peculiarly Western history (Asad 2007; Bell 1992). Under
this folk category, however, are numerous cognitively and
behaviorally universal patterns that are normally associated
with the term “ritual,” including such phenomena as syn-
chronic movement, causally opaque action, and both eu-
phoric and dysphoric arousal. These phenomena have distinct
causes and effects, including different consequences for co-
hesion and cooperation. Any attempt to answer the question
of how “ritual” as a monolithic entity produces cooperation
is therefore misguided. The fractionating strategy adopted
here, however, opens the door for a more precise account of
how various phenomena normally associated with the folk
term “ritual” affect thought and behavior.
While existing cognitive and evolutionary work on ritual
and cooperation discusses the effects of synchrony, signaling,
and arousal, it has only recently begun to examine one of the
most central components of what has traditionally been called
“ritual”: causal opacity (Herrmann et al. 2013; Legare et al.,
forthcoming; Nielbo and Sorensen 2011; Watson-Jones et al.,
forthcoming; Whitehouse 2011, 2012). Ritual behaviors are
assumed by participants and observers alike to lack a speci-
fiable causal structure and have no knowable instrumental
connections to end goals, if indeed any are imputed to them
(cf. Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994). Since rituals are not tightly
constrained by ordinary causal reasoning, they can assume a
potentially infinite range of forms and involve numerous dis-
tinct processes, such as aforementioned elements of synchrony
(Hove and Risen 2009; Bulbulia and Sosis; 2011; Fischer et
al. 2013; Reddish et al. 2013) and emotional arousal (Kon-
valinka et al. 2011; Xygalatas et al. 2013b). Given this diversity,
rituals can also serve as admirable group markers (Henrich
and Henrich 2007; Richerson and Boyd 2005).
Cohesion
While cognitive and evolutionary studies have considered how
various fractionated elements of the “ritual” category affect
cooperative dispositions and behavior, less discussion has
been devoted to the psychological processes through which
these phenomena accomplish their effects and whether the
psychological notion of “cohesion,” like the category “ritual,”
should also be fractionated to understand the effects of col-
lective rituals on cooperation.
The term “social cohesion” suggests that people can become
attached to each other so as to think and act as a group. But
the metaphor of social cohesion, however intuitively appeal-
ing, is somewhat vague. Building on earlier scholarship (e.g.,
To¨nnies 1887), Emile Durkheim (1995 [1912]) famously at-
tempted to characterize two broadly contrasting forms of so-
cial cohesion, which he labeled “mechanical” and “organic”
solidarity. Mechanical solidarity prevails in small societies or-
ganized into equivalent segments (like the rings of an earth-
worm; Durkheim 1997 [1893]). Durkheim described the psy-
chological glue binding together members of these segments
as the “conscience collectif,” reproduced and strengthened
through the performance of collective rituals. He contrasted
this with “organic solidarity,” which prevails in much larger
societies divided into specialized organs rather than func-
tionally equivalent segments, united by mutual interdepen-
dence in an elaborated division of labor, rather than by like-
ness. Durkheim’s ideas seemed to make sense of certain
differences between social life in small, relatively egalitarian
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communities, on the one hand, and large complex societies,
on the other.
Many social theorists have since discussed and updated
Durkheim’s conception of the two basic forms of solidarity,
producing a plethora of dichotomous theories along similar
lines (Haidt and Graham 2009; Peel 2004; Whitehouse 2013a).
But however inspiring the metaphor, Durkheim’s theories of
mechanical and organic solidarity and their derivatives have
proven difficult to test empirically or, if taken too literally,
would seem to be false. For instance, would Durkheim’s the-
ory predict that the collective conscience is really stronger in
a band of egalitarian hunter-gatherers than in a highly strat-
ified complex society such as Nazi Germany? Clearly, some-
thing akin to what Durkheim described as a strong “collective
conscience” can be intensely felt in modern states (White-
house and McQuinn 2013) whereas even the quite low levels
of cohesion needed to accomplish community goals may be
lacking in many small-scale traditional societies (Lee 1979).
Another issue facing classical typologies of cohesion is their
conflation of sociological and psychological phenomena.
Durkheim’s model of mechanical solidarity, for instance, ac-
cords a role to both social processes (e.g., repressive sanctions)
and psychological ones (e.g., collective consciousness) without
clearly differentiating their respective contributions. We argue
that these issues of testability and conflation in much social
theory can be addressed by employing a distinction in con-
temporary social psychology between two forms of cohesion:
identity fusion and group identification. These two forms, we
argue, capture more precisely the underlying psychological
processes assumed by the dichotomies of Durkheim and oth-
ers. Moreover, the effects of fusion and identification have
been extensively documented experimentally, and different
modes of ritual practice can be shown to produce these dis-
tinct bonds.
Identity fusion occurs when a social identity becomes an
essential component of our personal self-concept (Swann et
al. 2012). Identity fusion has a number of downstream be-
havioral outcomes. For instance, when another group mem-
ber is threatened, it prompts the same defensive reactions as
a personal attack or an attack on one’s kin (Buhrmester et
al., forthcoming; Swann et al. 2010a). Further, since social
identities are essential parts of fused individuals’ personal self-
concepts, physiological arousal of the individual translates
into pro-group action (Swann et al. 2009). And perhaps most
importantly, fused individuals demonstrate a significant will-
ingness to sacrifice themselves for their groups (Swann et al.
2010b). This form of cohesion, we argue, captures much of
what Durkheim called “mechanical solidarity” and To¨nnies
dubbed Gemeinschaft; it fits with our most up-to-date un-
derstanding of psychology, it is testable, and it helps answer
the enduring question of what makes individuals sacrifice
themselves for imagined communities.
Identity fusion contrasts sharply with group identification.
Rather than a feeling of shared essence with the group, iden-
tified individuals merely feel that they share certain proto-
typical features with other group members that are not es-
sential to their individual, personal identities (Go´mez et al.
2011). We all have a sense of personal identity, in the form
of unique personal histories and personality traits that define
us as distinct from other people, but we also all have social
identities, as members of groups that make us similar to oth-
ers. Social identity researchers have argued that personal and
social identities are normally like oil and water—if one is
activated, the other is not, and the more one prevails in the
individual’s social life, the less prominently the other features
(e.g., the more I think of myself as an American, the less I
am thinking about my personal self and the more I am think-
ing about the prototypical qualities of American-ness; Tajfel
and Turner 1979). For people who are identified but not fused
with the group, external threats to the community are not
seen as threats to one’s family, and physiological arousal does
not produce pro-group action (Swann et al. 2009). Further,
increased levels of group identification fail to predict extreme
self-sacrifice in Trolley Dilemmas (Go´mez et al. 2011; Swann
et al. 2010b) and offer less power for predicting individuals’
expressed willingness to fight, sacrifice, and die for one’s social
group (Swann et al. 2012). These findings regarding the dif-
ferent nature and effects of fusion and identification suggest
that they are quite distinct phenomena and that, as we argue
below, the mechanisms underlying them may well have dif-
ferent evolutionary histories.
Psychological Kinship and Fusion
We hypothesize that two psychological processes underlie
identity fusion and its ability to explain costly altruistic action:
(1) the construction of self-concepts through episodic mem-
ory, (2) kin detection through phenotypic matching. We argue
that episodic memories play a central role in the construction
and essential constitution of individual self-concepts, such
that experiences and particular elements of those experiences,
such as identities, persons, and objects, can become defining,
essential aspects of one’s personal identity. Further, we argue
that the perception of essential elements of one’s personal
self-concept in another individual triggers our evolved but
fallible kin recognition systems. Consequently, for a fused
individual, group members are not perceived as mere coop-
erators; they are psychological kin.
Evolutionary biologists have long puzzled over altruistic
behavior in social species, where an individual pays a lifetime
fitness cost to perform a behavior that enhances the fitness
of another. Many such cases of altruistic behavior can be
explained by inclusive fitness theory, which shows that self-
sacrifice can evolve under natural selection if it produces an
increase in the frequency of the altruist’s genes. For this to
occur, the degree of genetic relatedness of the altruist mul-
tiplied by the benefit to the recipient must be greater than
the reproductive cost to the altruist (Hamilton 1964). One
way to ensure the altruism is directed toward relatives is for
the would-be altruists to have some way of detecting their
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kin. Since the genetic makeup of individuals cannot be ob-
served directly without sophisticated scientific apparatus,
evolved solutions to this problem are likely to involve cues
that reliably correlate with genetic relatedness (Park et al.
2008; Penn and Frommen 2010).
In the case of humans and many other species, perceptions
of phenotypic similarity, along with familiarity, serve as kin
recognition heuristics and play an important role in governing
altruistic behavior. For example, psychological experiments
using morphed faces have shown that we behave more altru-
istically, and are less sexually attracted, toward individuals who
look more like ourselves (DeBruine 2004, 2005). Similarly, in
humans, as in many other species, odor is also used to detect
kin (Gerlach and Lysiak 2006; Weisfeld et al. 2003). Humans,
however, may not be limited to physiological cues; perhaps
uniquely, humans also appear to use shared mental attributes,
such as certain attitudes, to detect and favor genetic relatives
(Park and Schaller 2005).
Not all mental attributes, however, are created equal in their
ability to distinguish close genetic kin. An innate tendency to
perform more costly altruistic acts toward individuals who
are mentally similar to you without discriminating between
domains of similarity carries a great risk of exploitation. Hu-
mans, as a result of our evolved ethnic psychology (Henrich
and Henrich 2007), are very adept at imitating the body dec-
orations and fashions of others and learning the beliefs and
behavioral conventions of those around them. Any kin-de-
tection system that relied on perceiving shared beliefs and
values could easily end up mistaking all group members for
genetic relatives.
We argue that while perceiving shared social norms, which
are acquired through instruction and stored in semantic
memory, will result in intuitions of shared group membership
and trustworthiness via the workings of ethnic psychology
(Henrich and Henrich 2007; Richerson and Boyd 2005); it
will not trigger kin recognition and the resulting state of “psy-
chological kinship” (Bailey and Nava 1989; Park et al. 2008).
What will trigger psychological kinship is the perception that
one shares with others episodic memories that are essential
components of one’s autobiographical self-concept (Boyer
2009; Bruner 1990; Conway 1996; Damasio 2010; McAdams
2008) since sharing such essential, self-defining experiences
serves as a fairly reliable marker of genetic relatedness.
Humans have a highly developed capacity for episodic
memory, the capacity to recall distinctive events in the past
(Tulving 1983). Although there has been some debate about
whether episodic memory is a uniquely human capacity, it is
a much more complex system in humans than in other pri-
mates (Schwartz and Evans 2001). Episodic memory is com-
monly contrasted with semantic memory, which stores facts
about the world (such as the knowledge that Paris is the capital
of France) and social norms (such as the belief that one should
pray before eating) that are not tied to a particular event or
sequence of events. The ability to recall salient life experiences
as unique episodes in the past plays a central role in the
construction of a person’s autobiographical knowledge and
highly valued narrative self-concept, the sense of “who they
are” (Bloch 2012; Conway 1996; Damasio 2010; Dennett
1992). Further, evidence suggests that human beings view
some elements of these narratives as more essential than oth-
ers (Singer and Salovey 1993; Wilson and Ross 2003). Cru-
cially for the notion of identity fusion, we hypothesize that
essential components of one’s autobiographical self, resulting
from significant life events stored in episodic memory and
ranging from the formative experiences of childhood to shar-
ing the traumas of front-line warfare, can be perceived as
shared with others in a group. We hypothesize that for hu-
mans, with our enhanced episodic memory and narrative
selves, the “self” template used in phenotypic matching may
involve not only cues of facial resemblance and similar major
histocompatibility complexes (Villenger and Waldman 2012)
but also cues of shared experience and personal essence. The
perception that one shares with another important, self-de-
fining experience encoded in episodic memory, we argue, pro-
duces a powerful sense of psychological kinship.
While a variety of experiences can become essential ele-
ments of one’s autobiographical self-concept, a significant
body of evidence suggests that highly dysphoric experiences,
one of the fractionated elements of the category “ritual,” are
especially powerful (Conway 1995). Recent research suggests
that highly dysphoric experiences, such as front-line combat
(Whitehouse and McQuinn 2013) and “rites of terror”
(Whitehouse 1996), work to rewrite individual self-concepts
and produce psychological kinship among those undergoing
such experiences together. For example, in a survey of fighters
in the 2011 revolution in Libya, we found that degree of shared
dysphoria in battle predicted strength of fusion with brigade
(Whitehouse 2012); Matthews et al. (forthcoming) found that
veterans of the Vietnam War who witnessed comrades being
killed or wounded became more fused with the identity “Viet-
nam veterans” but not more identified; in a recent survey of
over 450 Spaniards, Go´mez et al. (forthcoming) found that
thinking about shared dysphoric experiences with other Span-
iards predicted greater willingness to fight and die for Spain.
Moreover, people spontaneously describe fusion using the
language of kinship and familial relatedness. Buhrmester and
colleagues (forthcoming) found that fused Americans were
much more likely to offer help to the 2013 Boston Marathon
bombing victims and to report a willingness to sacrifice their
lives to ensure that the bombers would be caught—and cru-
cially that this effect of identity fusion on altruism was fully
mediated by feelings of psychological kinship with all Amer-
icans (as evidenced by support for such statements as: “mem-
bers of my country are like family to me” and “if someone
in my country is hurt or in danger, it is like a family member
is hurt or in danger”). In addition, McKay et al. (forthcoming)
have found preliminary evidence that, when individuals who
are fused with a national identity think explicitly about that
identity, they find sexual words less accessible than those who
are not fused with that national identity, suggesting that the
q3
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psychological kinship produced by fusion affects both altru-
ism and incest avoidance. Our hypotheses require further
investigation, but initial research suggests that dysphoric ex-
periences often work to construct individual self-concepts in
such a way that elements of those experiences, such as social
identities, become essential elements of personal selves. Our
research suggests that perceiving these essential elements in
other people triggers the phenotypic matching process re-
sulting in psychological kinship.
Coalitional Psychology and Identification
While fusion may have evolved as part of our kin psychology
to promote altruism among small bands of genetic relatives,
group identification seems to have emerged as a bonding
mechanism for larger assemblages of more distantly related
individuals alongside other “tribal social instincts” (Richerson
and Boyd 2005) designed to allow the individual to reap the
benefits of group living.
Group identification is the perception that one belongs and
is committed to a social group (Mael and Ashforth 1992;
Tajfel and Turner 1985). According to social identity theory,
individuals have not only personal self-concepts but also social
self-concepts, used to classify themselves and others into
groups. These social identities are defined according to pro-
totypical characteristics, such as the group’s beliefs, practices,
and values (Turner 1985). Consequently, group identification
involves categorical rather than relational ties with others
(Brewer and Gardner 1996); when one is identified with a
group, one is not relating to other members as unique in-
dividual persons, but simply as anonymous members of the
same social category who share the prototypical beliefs, prac-
tices, and values of the group (Tajfel and Turner 1979). This
anonymity is demonstrated in studies using the minimal
group paradigm, in which participants become biased in favor
of in-groups defined by trivial criteria and containing indi-
viduals whom they have never previously encountered (e.g.,
Billig and Tajfel 1973).
The psychological mechanisms underlying group identifi-
cation have little to do with autobiographical self-concepts
and kin recognition. Rather, group identification appears to
be a product of our evolved coalitional psychology (Henrich
and Henrich 2007; Kurzban and Neuberg 2005) that allows
us to learn, follow, and enforce the social norms of larger,
more anonymous communities and benefit from the coop-
erative dividends such norms provide, especially in times of
uncertainty and threat. While humans could rely on kin al-
truism (Hamilton 1964) and reciprocity (Trivers 1971) to reap
the benefits of cooperation in small, face-to-face social groups,
new psychological adaptations were required to benefit from
cooperation and accumulated cultural knowledge in larger
communities defined by symbolic identity markers (Henrich
and Henrich 2007; Richerson and Boyd 2005). One possibility
is that through the process of gene-culture coevolution, hu-
man beings evolved biases to preferentially learn and commit
to beliefs, behaviors, and values from prestigious individuals
(Henrich and Gil-White 2001), from the majority of members
in their groups (Boyd and Richerson 1985), and from those
individuals who demonstrate commitment to these social
norms through their actions (Henrich 2009). Moreover,
mathematical models and cross-cultural experimental studies
suggest that humans evolved further biases to preferentially
cooperate with individuals sharing these prototypical group
norms (Richerson and Henrich 2012), to punish altruistic
group members violating these norms (Bowles and Gintis
2011; Gintis 2000), and to commit more strongly to these
norms in the face of threat (Navarrete et al. 2004; Sosis 2007).
While a variety of domain general and motivational accounts
of group identification have been proposed (Greenburg, Sol-
omon, and Pyszczynski 1997; Tajfel and Turner 1979), the
coalitionary psychological roots of group identification are
clearly apparent in minimal group paradigm studies in which
participants actually favor out-groups (Rabbie, Schot, and
Visser 1989) or demonstrate fairness across groups (Karp et
al. 1993) when their task payoffs come from other sources
besides the in-group (Kurzban and Neuberg 2005). In these
studies, shared identity is meaningless without the collective
benefits such identities are designed to provide.
Group identification can be amplified by perceptions of
threat and uncertainty (Greenberg et al. 1990; Kay et al. 2008;
Navarrete et al. 2004) and, we predict, by witnessing others
displaying strong commitment to the prototypical norms of
the group (Henrich 2009). Identification with a group can
produce prejudice and preferential cooperation (Tajfel et al.
1971). Yet, evidence suggests group identification is relatively
weak in producing the extreme pro-group behaviors we see
in war, suicide terrorism, and other forms of costly altruism
(Swann et al. 2010b). Without the power of fusion and psy-
chological kinship, group identification produces committed
citizens but not extreme self-sacrifice. Willingness to sacrifice
self to further the interests of large-scale anonymous com-
munities, such as nation or world religion, has been described
as “extended fusion” (Swann et al. 2012). There may be mul-
tiple ways in which extended fusion comes about, but recent
empirical research suggests that the priming of familial sen-
timents and the sharing of dysphoric experiences, such as
wars and national disasters, “pulls people together,” moti-
vating altruistic behavior even toward strangers (Buhrmester
et al., forthcoming).
Ritual and Cohesion
We hope to have made clear that ritual and cohesion are not
unified objects of analysis amenable to empirical investigation,
making the question “How does ritual produce social cohe-
sion?” misguided. Rather, beneath these commonly used
terms are a diverse set of phenomena including causally
opaque conventions, synchrony, dysphoric and euphoric
arousal, identity fusion, and group identification. With the
precision provided by this process of fractionation, we can
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take a fresh look at the question of ritual’s impact on group
cohesion, considering how the different elements of “ritual”
affect fusion and identification.
Scrutiny of the ethnographic and historical record (Atkin-
son and Whitehouse 2010; Whitehouse 1995, 2000, 2004;
Whitehouse and Laidlaw 2004; Whitehouse and Martin 2004;
Whitehouse and McCauley 2005a) suggests that collective rit-
uals come in two main packages of ritual elements, with one
package working to produce fusion and the other to produce
identification. The fact that there are two modes of ritual
cohesion is no accident. Viewed within an evolutionary frame-
work, different societies require higher or lower levels of fu-
sion or identification to fulfill their basic material and eco-
nomic needs in diverse resource environments (Whitehouse
and Hodder 2010; Whitehouse and McQuinn 2013), and the
two ritual packages evolve, through a process of cultural group
selection, to produce the required levels of fusion or identi-
fication (Turchin et al. 2012).
One of these packages, based on what have become known
as “imagistic practices” (Whitehouse 1995), involves a com-
bination of causally opaque conventional actions and high
levels of dysphoric arousal. These features work together to
produce fusion among participants, binding them together as
psychological kin and preparing them to participate in high-
risk activities such as hunting dangerous animals and going
to war. The other package, based on so-called doctrinal prac-
tices (Whitehouse 1995), involves frequently repeated causally
opaque conventional actions with low levels of dysphoric
arousal but heavily emphasizing credibility-enhancing dis-
plays for beliefs, ideologies, and values. This package works
to produce at least baseline levels of group identification and
thus sufficient trust to cooperate with strangers or relative
strangers in ways required by centralized and often expan-
sionary systems of governance, trade, and agriculture.
Ritual, Shared Dysphoria, and Fusion
Some rituals involve such extreme forms of torture that it
would not be an exaggeration to describe them as “rites of
terror” (Whitehouse 1996). Rites of terror abound in small-
scale traditional societies engaged in raiding and warfare but
also in modern armies and rebel groups. The kinds of ordeals
inflicted on participants in such rituals are no less traumatic
than those associated with medieval torture or the world’s
most repressive dictatorships. In Melanesian initiation cults,
for example, boys undergoing initiation rites may be exten-
sively burned, permanently scarred and mutilated, dehy-
drated, beaten, and have objects inserted in sensitive areas
such as the nasal septum, the base of the spine, the tongue,
and the penis (Allen 1967; Barth 1975; Tuzin 1980). Often
these agonizing procedures are deliberately rendered more
terrifying through the use of threats, humiliations, or the use
of extreme forms of punishment for incompetent or diso-
bedient behavior (Whitehouse 1996). Such examples of dys-
phoric rituals are legion and can be found in virtually any
region of the world given sufficient historical and ethno-
graphic information. Consequently the need for a general
theory of rites of terror has long been recognized.
There have been several anthropological theories of how
such rites work to produce cohesion, including Turner’s the-
ory of “communitas” (1969, 1974) and Bloch’s theory of “re-
bounding violence” (1992). One of the most striking limi-
tations of these anthropological theories, however, is that
although they might seem to capture some common under-
lying patterns in the symbolism of rites of terror, they fail to
explain why these kinds of practices are actually so painful
and potentially harmful (Whitehouse 1996). To accomplish
the desired effects symbolically should require only that par-
ticipants act out the narrative of separation and reincorpor-
ation as a sort of victory for society but not that people should
actually be wounded, maimed, or even killed. The costs of
participation seem to be out of all proportion to the imputed
symbolic value.
By contrast, psychologists and evolutionary scientists have
attempted to tackle the costly nature of rites of terror head-
on, with Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance explaining
why paying a more severe cost for joining a group should
produce increased “liking” of that group and its members
(Aronson and Mills 1959; Festinger 1957) and the theory of
costly signaling (e.g., Bulbulia 2004; Sosis 2003), suggesting
that participation in such costly acts should serve as a reliable
signal of group commitment and allow group members to
trust one another enough to cooperate.
Although these theories directly address the puzzle of ritual
dysphoria, they all assume that participation is voluntary. If
participants in initiation rituals freely chose to undergo acute
traumas in order to join the group, this might indeed lead
them to conclude that group membership is worth the price.
Likewise, to serve as a convincing signal of commitment to
the group, participation would have to be freely undertaken.
And yet in all or most of the initiation rituals described by
anthropologists, participation is coerced (Cimino 2011). If
the penalties for flinching or running away are certain death,
the prospects of suffering but surviving the ritual ordeal are
comparatively attractive (Whitehouse 2004).
A further limitation of many previous theories of dysphoric
ritual is that they are only applicable to initiations. Rites of
terror, however, constitute a much wider category including
vision quests, cargo cults, millenarian rituals, possession cults,
and rites of contrition, expiation, and penance (Atkinson and
Whitehouse 2011). In principle, it would be desirable to have
an encompassing explanation for all rites of terror rather than
one that only applies to an arbitrary subset of them.
The limitations of previous theories of rites of terror can
be overcome by viewing shared ritual dysphoria as part of an
imagistic complex that generates identity fusion via the per-
ceived sharing of memorable and personally salient experi-
ences. We believe the key to the process lies in combining the
causal opacity of ritual with the autobiography-shaping effects
of negatively valenced experiences. When people undergo
q4
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painful or frightening experiences, they remember them as
life-shaping episodes (Conway 1995), or what Singer and Sa-
lovey call “self-defining memories” (1993). Such experiences
prompt considerable reflection afterward, and this process
generates richer representations of the episode and its sig-
nificance, strengthening the impression that only those who
have experienced the same thing can possibly understand how
it feels and what it means. Adding the causal opacity of ritual
to this heady mixture of ingredients likely amplifies the effect,
producing a particularly robust and enduring state of psy-
chological kinship among coparticipants (Whitehouse 2004).
In a series of experiments using artificial rituals and varying
levels of arousal (intensity of fear and anxiety), we have shown
that, after a time delay, the volume and specificity of inter-
pretive reflection on the rituals are greater among participants
in a dysphoric condition than for controls (Richert et al. 2005;
Russell, Gobet, and Whitehouse, forthcoming). Similar effects
have been found using field studies, by systematically com-
paring the interpretive richness of people’s accounts of rituals
involving variable levels of dysphoria (Xygalatas 2007). Dys-
phoric ritual fuses us to fellow participants as part of a com-
plex we describe as “imagistic practices” because of the sa-
lience and memorability of the imagery they evoke, leading
us to feel a deep and enduring sense of kinship with those
who have shared the same experiences (Whitehouse 1995,
2000, 2004).
Ritual, Routinization, and Identification
Routinized rituals are obviously a widespread feature of the
world religions, but high-frequency, low-arousal rituals are
also commonplace in many traditional societies as well (At-
kinson and Whitehouse 2011). Examples may be found in
Africa (e.g., the Mbuti of Cameroon and the Masaii of Kenya),
Asia (e.g., the Himalayan Lepache and the Ifageo of the Phil-
ippines), North America (e.g., the Iroquois and Hopi), Pol-
ynesia (e.g., the Trobriand Islanders and the Tikopia), and
many other regions.
Efforts to explain the link between repetitive rituals and
social complexity have a long history in the social sciences
(Whitehouse 1995), much of it influenced by Max Weber’s
early writings on “routinization,” the process by which a newly
established religious group becomes embedded institutionally,
its beliefs and rituals standardized and subject to the authority
of a priestly hierarchy (Weber 1947). Weber’s contrast between
routinized and charismatic authority has inspired many others
like it: Ernest Gellner’s pendulum swing theory of Islam,
which proposed an oscillation between urban orthodoxies and
the more emotional rituals of rural tribes (Gellner 1969);
Victor Turner’s distinction between structure and “commu-
nitas” (Turner 1974); Ruth Benedict’s distinction between
“Appolonian” and “Dionysian” religions (Benedict 1934); and
Ioan Lewis’s distinction between central and peripheral cults
(Lewis 1971). This list could be elaborated almost indefinitely
(Peel 2004), but none of these dichotomous theories ade-
quately specifies the cognitive mechanisms and evolved func-
tions of modes of religiosity necessary to explain why they
exist in the first place (Whitehouse 1995, chap. 8).
The key to understanding the cognitive consequences of
routinization lies in the effects on memory of regular partic-
ipation in collective rituals and the ability of these rituals to
produce and enhance identification with the group (White-
house 2004). Repetition of rituals and beliefs makes them
easier to remember accurately. They become a stable part of
worshippers’ semantic memory, their general knowledge
about the world as opposed to their memory for particular
episodic experiences. As the procedural rules for participation
in collective rituals are transformed into familiar and auto-
matic habits, reflection on their meaning and significance
declines. And high-frequency repetition also makes it easier
to detect and punish deviations from the orthodoxy. Routin-
ization is one of the hallmarks of the “doctrinal mode of
religiosity” (Whitehouse 1995, 2000, 2004), a way of codifying
and transmitting creeds that leads to identification with large,
centralized, hierarchical traditions.
The beliefs and practices of doctrinal religions tend to
spread through the pronouncements of authority figures
(such as priests, gurus, prophets, and messiahs) and artifacts
(such as sacred texts) rather than being the outcome of per-
sonal reflection and experience. Likewise the emblems,
clothes, and body decorations that demarcate religious iden-
tities in the doctrinal mode are bestowed upon adherents from
the outside through a “trickle down” process of cultural trans-
mission and not experienced as resulting from a “bubble up”
process from within. Expressions of group identity in a rou-
tinized cultural tradition do not strongly activate core aspects
of the personal self because for the most part they do not
feature in personal autobiography and do not arise out of
internal reflection on salient life experiences. For the same
reason, activation of the personal self makes the social self
less salient (Swann et al. 2012).
Although doctrinal practices provide an effective method
of standardizing beliefs and practices and producing group
identification among a large population, the creation of large
anonymous communities presents problems of cooperation
that our ethnic/coalitional psychology is not sufficient to ad-
dress. These are largely problems of how to monitor the rep-
utations of others and decide whom to trust. Sharing the same
beliefs and practices may not always be a sufficiently reliable
indicator of trustworthiness, since the insignia of group mem-
bership can be faked, and declarations of belief could be in-
sincere. Our fractionation strategy allows us to distinguish a
number of culturally evolved mechanisms for addressing these
kinds of problems, including external mnemonics (e.g., writ-
ing and record keeping), the postulation of morally concerned
and punitive deities, and the spread of more costly credibility
enhancing displays.
External mnemonics have taken ever more sophisticated
forms as societies have grown in size and complexity. Perhaps
the most revolutionary of these developments was the advent
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of writing as a means of recording economic transactions that
would otherwise have been hard to remember or that could
have been subject to deliberate manipulation for personal gain
(Whitehouse 2004). Over time, record keeping came to as-
sume a wide variety of other functions such as storing in-
formation relevant to reputational standing, like criminal re-
cords, genealogies, and census data (Goody 1968). Most
importantly, literacy provided a way of further stabilizing rit-
ual systems so as to encompass ever larger populations as part
of increasingly complex systems of centralized governance and
stratification (Mullins, Whitehouse, and Atkinson 2013).
There has been some debate about the first emergence and
relative contributions of ritual routinization and literacy to
the standardization of religious creeds and other ideologies
(Goody 2004; Johnson 2004; Whitehouse 2004), but it now
seems evident that routinization came first and literacy served
to extend its effects (Mullins, Whitehouse, and Atkinson 2013;
Whitehouse and Hodder 2010).
As societies grow in size, problems of monitoring become
increasingly acute. If you cannot personally know all the other
members of your community, then you cannot track their
histories and reputations. One culturally evolved mechanism
designed to make people more honest in large anonymous
societies is thought to be the emergence and spread of beliefs
in a supernatural watcher: “eyes in the sky” endowed with
the capacity to observe and punish transgressions. Thus, the
postulation of all-knowing moralizing gods may serve to deter
antisocial behavior beyond the reach of secular institutions
(Atran and Henrich 2010; Norenzayan and Shariff 2008), and
this may help to explain why moralizing high gods are most
prevalent in large and complex societies (Johnson 2005; No-
renzayan 2013).
Nevertheless, the spread of beliefs in morally concerned
and punitive deities only increases levels of prosociality and
trust necessary for cooperation if those beliefs are held sin-
cerely, motivate behavior, and are signaled reliably to others.
The credibility-enhancing display (CRED) model (Atran and
Henrich 2010; Henrich 2009) proposes that the transmission
of otherwise difficult-to-accept beliefs, such as the existence
of omnipresent supernatural watchers, is facilitated by the
performance of seemingly costly behaviors by models or
teachers. These are behaviors that a model would be unlikely
to engage in unless sincerely committed to the belief in ques-
tion. Such an evolved bias, allowing learners to avoid ma-
nipulation by teachers, is harnessed by doctrinal religions by
virtue of routinization—frequent attendance as religious cer-
emonies is in itself an influential CRED. When doctrinal
traditions compete, routinization alone may not be sufficient
to provide the “edge” in between group competition, possibly
leading to the evolution of ever more costly CREDs (e.g., fire
walking, sacrifices, circumcision, and celibacy). We are cur-
rently conducting both survey and experimental research to
examine the role of credibility-enhancing displays in the ac-
quisition of religious beliefs and identification with religious
groups, with initial results showing that exposure to CREDs
significantly predicts both theism and religious affiliation
among American Christians while controlling for measures
of religious socialization (Lanman and Buhrmester, forthcom-
ing).
Ritual and the Evolution of Divergent Modes
of Cohesion
We have argued that different kinds of collective rituals pro-
duce different kinds of group cohesion. Life-changing, emo-
tionally intense (especially dysphoric) rituals produce identity
fusion and a durable sense of psychological kinship with other
group members. This psychological kinship motivates rela-
tively extreme forms of altruism, especially when the group
is threatened. By contrast, routinized rituals produce identi-
fication that serves to enhance prosociality, trust, and coop-
eration toward the members of potentially very large groups
comprising anonymous others, at least when salient social
cues are present and when the group’s prospects are healthy.
The cross-cultural recurrence of the two ritual packages is no
accident. Rather, we argue, imagistic and doctrinal practices
have evolved to produce the cohesion necessary for societies
to be successful in different resource ecologies.
The world’s ritual traditions are drawn to the attractor
positions of the imagistic and doctrinal “modes of religiosity”
(Whitehouse 2004; Whitehouse and Laidlaw 2004; White-
house and Martin 2004; Whitehouse and McCauley 2005a).
Other packages of fractionated ritual elements, such as caus-
ally opaque actions combined with low emotional arousal and
infrequent performance or casually opaque actions combined
with high dysphoric arousal and daily performance, are quite
infrequent in the ethnographic record (Atkinson and White-
house 2011). Rather, the more rarely a collective ritual is
performed, the more likely it is to incorporate extremely dys-
phoric ordeals. This prediction has been confirmed by ana-
lyzing data on 645 religious rituals from 74 cultures around
the globe, extracted from the Human Relations Area Files
(Atkinson and Whitehouse 2011). Controlling for a wide
range of other variables, there exists a strong inverse corre-
lation between ritual frequency and dysphoria.
This strong pattern in the ethnographic record raises the
question of what selective force is driving cultural rituals to-
ward the imagistic and doctrinal ritual packages. A crucial
clue is the discovery of an inverse correlation between rare,
dysphoric rituals and levels of agricultural intensity, suggesting
a link between a society’s mode of resource acquisition and
the frequency and emotionality of its rituals (Atkinson and
Whitehouse 2011). Our claim is that the two ritual packages
evolve to support particular resource-acquisition strategies
perhaps through a process of cultural group selection (Hen-
rich 2004; Richerson and Christiansen 2013; Whitehouse
2013b). Some resource-acquisition strategies require (or are
greatly facilitated by) fusion. Others require (or are greatly
facilitated by) group identification. Societies may develop the
ritual packages necessary to produce the levels of fusion and/
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or identification required for their resource-acquisition strat-
egies to function or they stand a much lower chance of sur-
vival.
Some resource-acquisition strategies present individuals
with strong reasons to defect and free-ride on the risky actions
of others. Hunting large and dangerous game and warfare are
two prime examples of such strategies (Whitehouse 1996,
2004; Whitehouse and Hodder 2010; Whitehouse and
McQuinn 2013). Big-game hunting and warfare require stead-
fastness for success and, if a society dependent upon such
strategies is to flourish, it must possess some method by which
to produce intense, kin-like cohesion among the individuals
engaged in these strategies.
Other resource-acquisition strategies present a rather dif-
ferent problem. Taxation, large-scale farming, and a complex
division of labor may reduce certain risks of defection while
increasing others that require a sense commitment to the
imagined community (Anderson 1983). If individuals with
no experience of one another are to trust each other enough
to cooperate, then shared beliefs, values, and other identity
markers are required. If societies dependent upon such strat-
egies are to flourish, they must possess some method by which
to transmit these shared norms (Henrich and Henrich 2007).
Our prediction is that societies that survive and flourish
through these resource-acquisition strategies will possess rit-
uals of the appropriate “package” (imagistic or doctrinal), a
view originally supported by analysis of ethnographic data
extracted from the Human Relations Area Files (Atkinson and
Whitehouse 2011) and now being further tested using ar-
chaeological, historical, and contemporary data.
Archaeological research is showing that the transition from
small-group living to larger, more complex societies may have
involved a transformation in the frequency and emotionality
of ritual and accompanying changes in the nature of group
cohesion (Whitehouse and Hodder 2010). A key hypothesis
is that ancient hunter-gatherers needed to be bound into
tightly cohesive units as a defense against predation and an
insurance against hard times in challenging environments and
that this required imagistic practices and bonds of psycho-
logical kinship among groups of warriors and hunters. This
hypothesis is currently being tested based on systematic quan-
titative analysis of large data sets (Whitehouse et al. 2014;
Mazzucato et al., forthcoming). The focus of this work has
been primarily on the transition from foraging to farming in
central Anatolia and the Levant, spanning a period from the
end of the Paleolithic to the beginning of the Chalcolithic.
The broad picture that has emerged from this research is that,
in this region at least, ancestral hunter-gatherers lived in small
bands fused by hunting-feasting cults involving arduous and
dangerous rituals, but as populations settled and expanded
with the advent of agriculture, the imagistic mode declined,
and more routinized beliefs and practices spread across the
region as a basis for identification with larger ethnic group-
ings.
Efforts to establish the extent to which patterns in the
Anatolian and Levantine material can be generalized are now
being pursued through the creation of a global historical da-
tabase capable of quantifying changing patterns of ritual fre-
quency and emotionality and correlating these with social
complexity variables on a global scale (Turchin et al. 2012).
Beginning as part of the ESRC-funded “Ritual, Community,
and Conflict” project, and later extended through additional
large grants from the SSHRC in Canada and the John Tem-
pleton Foundation in the United States, historical database
construction promises to deliver radically new tools for his-
torical analysis. Traditional forms of historiography provide
detailed information about closely delimited time periods in
particular places or regions. But to examine the evolution of
social complexity in a rigorous fashion, we need to reorganize
what we know about the past so as to facilitate statistical
analyses showing what correlates with what on a global scale.
For example, what kinds of rituals correlate with what kinds
of social organization? This approach can also tell us if certain
kinds of rituals precede particular types of social morphology.
For example, does the historical record show that an increase
in the frequency of collective rituals typically (or invariably)
precedes and accompanies processes of state formation? Many
other hypotheses can be tested in this way. The creation of a
database of information about the human past worldwide,
searchable using statistical tools, is analogous to the way that
GenBank has allowed the biosciences to organize and store
our knowledge about gene sequences.
Even in the absence of precise and detailed information
about global historical trends, it seems clear that the first
emergence of the doctrinal mode was gradual, perhaps re-
sponding to incremental changes in modes of production.
But following that quantum leap in sociocultural evolution,
the blueprints for building these alternate modes of group
cohesion have facilitated the rapid emergence and spread of
both imagistic and doctrinal traditions, especially when cul-
tural group selection pressures are intense. Contemporary
rebel groups are a good case in point. Roughly half of all such
groups disband within 6 months of their first appearance, but
those that endure (in some cases for decades) rapidly develop
patterns of ritualization and group formation that are opti-
mally adapted to the challenges of resource extraction and
protection that prevail in their particular political environ-
ment (Beardsley and McQuinn 2009). The pace of ritual in-
novation and adaptation may be accelerated in rebel groups
due to the intense evolutionary pressures created by govern-
ment military and political campaigns. In such groups, im-
agistic formations create tight-knit relationships among a de-
fined group of individuals. In contrast, larger rebel
organizations use routinized rituals to codify political and
ideological commitments in a standardized fashion across en-
tire ethnic groups. Rebels may also pursue both methods of
group formation, although preliminary research suggests that
groups usually rely more heavily on one or another modality
(Whitehouse and McQuinn 2013).
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Conclusion
Ritualized behavior is rooted in our evolved psychology,
closely linked to our natural propensity to imitate trusted
others. Collective rituals have some striking affordances for
group building, hijacking our kinship psychology by fusing
us to fellow ritual participants or exploiting our coalitional
psychology by enabling us to identify with potentially vast
imagined communities. These processes are crucial to un-
derstanding the evolution of social complexity.
Participation in collective dysphoric rituals has been linked
to fusion with the group and parochial altruism. Dysphoric
rituals are remembered as distinctive episodes in a person’s
life experience. When people recall such experiences, they
reflect on their significance, over time developing highly elab-
orated webs of interpretation that they assume resemble the
thoughts and feelings of others who have undergone the same
experiences. The result is a fusion of self and other. Personal
and group interests and destinies are aligned, and threats to
the group are experienced as threats to self. In the course of
cultural evolution, collective rituals involving shared dyspho-
ria hijacked this mechanism favoring the survival of groups
with an “imagistic mode of religiosity” facing collective ac-
tions problems (e.g., on the battlefield or hunting ground)
involving high risk and strong temptations to defect.
With the invention of agriculture, larger and denser pop-
ulations no longer needed costly dysphoric rituals to bind
together bands of brothers for the purposes of defense, bride
capture, or hunting. Instead the groups that flourished and
spread were those that could overcome local divisions by
eliminating or tamping down imagistic tendencies and cul-
tivate instead a sense of shared identity on a much larger
scale. When an individual identifies with a group, the social
but not the personal self is activated, producing much weaker
expressions of cohesion and cooperation. Rituals can play an
important role in identification with groups, not by activating
lasting episodic memories and private reflection but rather
through the routinization of traditions, activating procedural
and semantic memory for conventional practices shared by
communities too large for their members to know each other
personally—a complex we refer to as the “doctrinal mode of
religiosity.” In western Asia, the doctrinal mode emerged
gradually during the Neolithic, eventually shaping the great
Bronze Age civilization of the Levant, Mesopotamia, and the
rise of empires in Egypt and Rome. Current efforts to con-
struct a database of world history will reveal whether similar
processes accompany the evolution of social complexity on a
global scale.
In developing these arguments, our general strategy has
been to fractionate the imprecise folk categories of “ritual”
and “social cohesion” into a series of components, the distinct
causes and consequences of which can be investigated by
specifying precise and testable hypotheses. Our overarching
evolutionary framework suggests that the fractionated com-
ponents are related to two broadly divergent paths to group
bonding, one that blurs the boundary between self and other,
promoting fusion and psychological kinship, the other that
activates coalitional thinking and group identification. Al-
though there remains much to learn about the relationship
between ritual and social cohesion, the new empirical research
reported here takes us much closer than we have been to
understanding the core processes by which collective rituals
bind us together.
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Whitehouse and Lanman refine a model that Whitehouse has
been arguing for since Inside The Cult: Religious Innovation
and Transmission in Papua New Guinea (1995). Specifically,
they focus on links between ritual and group solidarity, ar-
guing that two modes of ritual—routine, repetitive “doc-
trinal” rites and emotionally charged, dysphoric “imagistic”
rituals—produce either group identification or a stronger
form of identity fusion. As in earlier discussions on modes
of religiosity, these two phenomena are said to be under-
written by separate systems of declarative memory—episodic
and semantic—and they coincide with particular social struc-
tures and modes of production due to evolutionary processes.
Theirs is a sweeping theory, bold and engaging. The con-
trast between imagistic and doctrinal rituals, and the work
that Whitehouse, Lanman, and various collaborators have
made toward testing these hypotheses on a grand scale, are
significant contributions to anthropology. They seek to com-
bine evolutionary, psychological, social, and cultural per-
spectives, including classic work in our field. Any critique has
to at least acknowledge the enormity of the undertaking; their
work sets a high bar for any critique to match their empirical
scope and theoretical ambitions. What is new in this particular
iteration of the modes of religiosity theory is the discussion
of psychological mechanisms underwriting solidarity, espe-
cially the contrast between group identification and identity
fusion.
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As with any sweeping theory, however, the problem is what
goes under the carpet. Although Whitehouse and Lanman are
careful to limit the scope of the problem through “fraction-
ating,” they simultaneously raise a host of contentious issues
as they quickly sketch out quite lengthy chains of causation,
including controversial assertions about cultural evolution.
Moreover, the contrast between doctrinal and imagistic rituals
does not contain all ritual, as earlier work outlining these two
“attractors” in the “cultural morphospace of ritual” makes
clear (Atkinson and Whitehouse 2011). Discarded from the
theory are euphoric rituals of any sort, a difficult absence
given the importance of euphoria in cognitive and evolu-
tionary debates about the origin of religiosity. That gap also
undermines the query about what “selective force is driving
cultural rituals toward the imagistic and doctrinal ritual pack-
ages,” if the two-point distribution is an artifact of the anal-
ysis.
From the perspective of a theorist interested in neuroan-
thropology, however, one key issue is the way that the mo-
dalities of religion theory makes reference to neurological
mechanisms that might subserve ritualized behavior. The fo-
cus on the two declarative memory functions appears exces-
sively narrow, locating the key to a broad cultural and psy-
chological phenomenon in a single cognitive system, while
ignoring other plausible and nonexclusive explanations (such
as a link between doctrinal rituals and the rise of a specialist
class of religious specialists in agricultural societies).
This single-system cognitive account is inconsistent with
the baroque and heavily interconnected nature of most com-
plex cognitive activity (see Downey and Lende 2012:28). Even
Tulving (1972), who originally distinguished semantic from
episodic memory, argued that the two were intertwined; more
recent neurological research suggests that semantic memory
underwrites episodic recall, even that the two systems overlap
(see Greenberg and Verfaellie 2010). In fact, in some of their
discussion of doctrinal rituals, Whitehouse and Lanman offer
descriptions of what sounds like procedural, not semantic,
memory, like reference to nondeclarative “automatic habits.”
By definition, semantic memory is declarative. But highly
automated processes likely can underpin ritual social cohe-
sion, including synchronous action (like dance) or even in-
dividual habit (like handling prayer beads), suggesting a role
for nondeclarative types of memory.
The point is not to discard the overarching contrast be-
tween doctrinal and imagistic forms of ritual, or even the
argument that identity fusion may be the outcome of ritual
activity in specific conditions, which I find persuasive. The
point is that there is no reason why an important process like
social solidarity reinforcement would make use of only a single
cognitive system. There may be multiple ritual roads to fusion.
For example, the role of dysphoria is central to Whitehouse
and Lanman’s account of imagistic ritual, but this generates
two significant problems. First, some infrequent, highly emo-
tional rituals are not dysphoric, as the earlier work by Atkins
and Whitehouse (2011) clearly shows (and this article ac-
knowledges). Rituals like ecstatic and possession trance, rites
of passage involving ingested psychotropics, and carnivalesque
rituals all potentially provide powerful imagistic grist for the
mill of social identity. Not all “flashbulb” memories are pro-
duced by trauma. In fact, as psychological research clearly
shows, traumatic events can lead to suppressed memories.
Quite likely, traumatic rituals are recuperated into powerful
memories, in part, through social reinforcement, such as stag-
ing the same rituals for later generations, not just private
reflection and consolidation.
Finally, ritual activity does not simply make use of existing
neurological resources; disciplined religious practice, includ-
ing religious skills and trained patterns of cognition and at-
tribution, are themselves likely to shape cognitive capacities
and biases (see Luhrmann et al. 2010; Schjoedt 2009). Any
comprehensive account of the relationship between ritual ac-
tivity and human cognitive capacities must acknowledge a
two-way chain of cause and effect.
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In this remarkably rich and thoughtful article, the authors
introduce a bevy of provocative ideas. As identity researchers
with a specific interest in identity fusion, the ideas that most
intrigued us involved the mechanism through which rituals
increase fusion. Exactly how is it that rituals work their magic?
The authors put their money on the tendency for dysphoric
rituals to trigger exceptionally rich episodic memories. Once
formed, these memories are repeatedly activated and further
consolidated, eventually culminating in group representations
that figure prominently in the emotional landscape of group
members.
Although we would have preferred to see more details re-
garding how these processes unfold, the rough outlines seem
plausible enough. At the same time, as the authors implicitly
acknowledge, rival mechanisms must also be considered. Cog-
nitive dissonance theory seems like an obvious candidate. The
authors argue that dissonance theory cannot adequately ex-
plain the impact of ritual experiences on identity fusion be-
cause dissonance requires that actors undergo the dysphoric
activities freely. The authors contend that this is not always
the case. In some tribes, for example, failure to endure the
traumatic ritual is punishable by death, yet participation in
ritual foments attachment to the group. Fair enough. But
dissonance is merely one of several consistency theories. Other
consistency theories would not require that the actor freely
engage in the ritual behavior. Consider Heider’s (1960) bal-
ance theory. The theory suggests that people work to resolve
discrepancies between relationships between themselves, other
actors, and a third element (e.g., a behavior). In instances of
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dysphoric rituals, the actor would work to reconcile the fact
that the tribal elders (for whom he has respect if not liking)
are forcing him to engage in awful behaviors to become a
group member. To resolve the inconsistency created by the
positive valence toward the elder and negative valence toward
the dysphoric ritual behaviors, the actor decides that enduring
a bit of anguish is worthwhile because the group is so worth-
while.
The larger point here is that rituals occur in social contexts
and the relationships between the actors in such contexts may
figure prominently in the impact of such scenarios. Moving
slightly beyond the focus of the authors, it seems likely that
the consequences of rituals extend to all of the participants,
including the persons who orchestrate the ritual (e.g., the
elders in tribal initiation rites). In fact, we wonder if rituals
may be just as important in fostering fusion among those
who oversee the ritual as they are in fostering fusion among
the actors in the rituals. Insofar as fusion involves coming to
see other members as “family,” perhaps seeing new group
members relive the pain one experienced may augment the
meaningfulness of the original experience. Perhaps this over-
states the capacity for human empathy (the authors contend
that imagined suffering is not as potent as actual suffering),
but this possibility could be readily explored. For example,
in a military context, one might explore whether soldiers’
fusion levels intensify as they put others through the hellish
training that they themselves endured.
We were also curious about the authors’ emphasis on the
role of episodic (as compared to semantic) memory in the
effects of ritual. Although we agree that episodic memories
can exert powerful impact on phenomena such as group align-
ment, we would be surprised if semantic memory systems do
not sometimes produce similar effects. This possibility could
also be readily investigated.
Clearly, the authors are in the early stages of what should
prove to be a long and interesting journey. We look forward
to hearing more from them.
Daniel H. Lende
Department of Anthropology, University of South Florida, 4202 E.
Fowler Ave., SOC 107, Tampa, Florida 33620, U.S.A. (dl-
ende@usf.edu). 9 V 14
In August 1973, Janne Olsson set out to rob the Kreditbanken
located at Norrmalstorg Square in Stockholm, Sweden. Police
were called, and Olsson took hostages and retreated into the
bank vault. Olsson and his hostages lasted 6 days before police,
on their second attempt at flooding the bank with gas, forced
him to surrender. During those 6 days, Olsson submitted the
hostages to both cruelties and kindnesses. He hung nooses
around their necks, a threat that they would die after the
police first tried gas. He choked one hostage, forcing her to
scream, as he talked by phone with the Swedish prime min-
ister. But he also let negotiators bring in food and spoke with
the hostages about their lives. Some of the hostages later
reported feeling grateful for these kindnesses. One hostage
even called the prime minister to berate him for how he was
handling the situation, and said she wanted to go with Olsson
when he left the bank. Nils Bejerot, the Swedish psychiatrist
who helped the police during the standoff, labeled the hos-
tages’ identification with their captor as “Stockholm Syn-
drome.”
I highlight this example because ethnographic reality is
complex. In contrast, Whitehouse and Lanman present a sim-
ple approach to understand how we feel connections with
others outside our immediate family. They propose that ritual
shapes social cohesion in two separate ways: identity fusion
and group identification. Fusion works through emotion, in
particular pain and trauma that bind people together. Group
identification relies on cognition, largely through doctrinal
repetition of shared beliefs.
This approach has its strengths. Their evolutionary ap-
proach brings important perspectives to cultural questions.
Evolved biases can provide insight into how we might answer
questions about learning and the elaboration of cultural
forms. Their population perspective highlights potential at-
tractor states, such that culture is not entirely arbitrary but
might differentially emphasize imagistic or doctrinal modes
of ritual action.
This piece also helps keep alive ideas formulated by Durk-
heim and Weber. They mention Durkheim’s collective con-
sciousness, that sense of shared belief and identity derived
from ritual, but not his collective effervescence, where the
shared energy felt in groups often comes to focus on ritual
objects. Similarly, they draw on Weber’s work on routiniza-
tion, such that doctrine becomes standardized and enforced
through a religious hierarchy. However, Weber’s emphasis on
charisma and its alternating paths to shorter-lived personality
cults and longer-lived religious traditions does not enter the
picture.
Whitehouse and Lanman also highlight important unan-
swered questions. Why do so many rituals utilize dysphoric
states? Answering that question has to go beyond asserting
symbolic power to address the question of learning and en-
culturation. And why do doctrines need repetition to be caus-
ally effective? That question again focuses on how people
learn, recognizing the different ways that culture can become
embodied.
But the paper also has weaknesses. Their psychology comes
across as too simple. Stockholm Syndrome also needs rein-
forcement, or kindnesses, to promote a sense of fusion with
captors. On the identification side, psychological research
points to a more complex scenario. Roth and Steffens (2014)
examined preference for in-groups over out-groups using the
minimal group paradigm approach cited by Whitehouse and
Lanman. They found that “associative self anchoring” matters
even in group identification. In other words, categorization
is not enough; rather, the bias comes as one’s own self-eval-
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uation gets spread to in-groups (but not out-groups). Thus,
memory and meaning are also used to buttress social iden-
tities.
Whitehouse and Lanman also do not push their approach
to “fractionating” far enough. It is important to acknowledge
that “ritual” is not a monolithic entity, and that Western
theorizing can reflect as much our folk theories about other
people as actual science. Recognizing that broad concepts
often lump together different phenomena, with a need to look
at the potentially different causal processes, is to be applauded.
But this nascent critical approach does not go far enough.
Evolutionary and cognitive approaches also carry their own
problems that drag along “the baggage of a peculiarly Western
history,” such as the emotion/reason split that Whitehouse
and Lanman utilize.
Whitehouse and Lanman seem too captured by a line of
theorizing that has created both dysphoria and doctrine
within anthropology. For example, an understanding of the
neuroscience of memory—where research has shown how
memory recall leads to the reinterpretation of memory—en-
hances our understanding of how ritual does what it does
(Hay 2012). Similarly, work on trauma and war highlights a
more complex approach to understanding the links between
ritual, self, and identity (Collura and Lende 2012; Finley
2012). The field of neuroanthropology has been built to an-
swer the sorts of questions that Whitehouse and Lanman
propose (Lende and Downey 2012). This approach pushes
the critical and processual approach forward, while also add-
ing needed elements of neuroscience to our anthropological
understanding of how learning and enculturation happen for
both individuals and groups.
Robert N. McCauley
Center for Mind, Brain, and Culture, Emory University, 36 Eagle
Row, Atlanta; Georgia 30322, U.S.A. (philrnm@emory.edu). 5 IX
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Scientific Fractionation: Breaking the Ties
That Bind Us
Frustration with their central concepts plagues inquiries con-
cerned with cultural matters. The study of ritual is no ex-
ception. That frustration engenders interminable debates
about concepts and definitions. Occasionally, those debates
introduce some clarity locally, but, usually, they just elicit
protests about proposals’ failures to capture hard-won details
from another locale.
Sooner or later students of culture must recognize that
scientists’ strategy of fractionating phenomena to analyze
them more precisely and to construct relevant testable theories
is probably the most dependable means not only for breaking
these intellectual ties that bind us but for spawning new and
deeper explanatory insights. Whitehouse and Lanman capi-
talize on earlier fractionating studies of ritual (e.g., Neilbo
and Sorensen 2011) and apply their collaborative research in
social psychology (e.g., Swann et al. 2012) to fractionate social
cohesion too—all to great advantage.
The result is a dichotomous account of the connections
between distinctive patterns of both collective rituals and so-
cial cohesion, as mediated by considerations of group scale,
social psychology, and memory dynamics and as shaped by
the processes of cultural evolution in the face of diverse re-
source environments. With a few minor adjustments (e.g.,
focusing exclusively on dysphoric ritual in the imagistic
mode) and additions (e.g., incorporating CREDs into the doc-
trinal mode [Henrich 2009]), the resulting account squares
well with the view Whitehouse (1995, 2004) has defended for
two decades. Whitehouse and Lanman correctly note that this
substantially elaborated version of that theory with its detailed
and integrated specification of “the cognitive mechanisms and
evolved functions of modes of religiosity” possesses consid-
erably greater explanatory power and promise than any of its
dichotomous predecessors, including earlier versions of the
modes theory itself (McCauley and Lawson 2002).
Whitehouse and Lanman work hard to distinguish between
identity fusion and group identification and between the two
constellations of social and psychological conditions that un-
dergird them. They state, for example, that “personal and
social identities are normally like oil and water—if one is
activated, the other is not, and the more one prevails in the
individual’s social life, the less prominently the other fea-
tures.” Although the doctrinal mode generating group iden-
tification is the predominant pattern in agriculturally sus-
tained, large-scale groups, imagistic dynamics can operate as
well, eliciting psychological kinship and identity fusion—for
example, in the small units of modern armies. Exactly how
all of this works in individual psyches, particularly when the
orientations of identity fusion and group identification are
the same, deserves further consideration.
Their illustration of group identification concerns the na-
tional identity of “American-ness” and thinking “of myself
as an American.” Subsequent claims they offer about the role
that dysphoric experiences play in identify fusion, however,
complicate this picture. Whitehouse and Lanman talk about
“individuals who are fused with a national identity” and about
“fused Americans.” Who are fused Americans? How did they
get that way? More specifically, who were the participants in
the study reporting on their willingness to help the victims
of the Boston Marathon bombing? What determines which
among their Southie, their Bostonian, their Massachusettsan,
their New Englander, their American, and, possibly, their
Christian identities is operative? How widespread and how
lasting are these effects?
More fundamentally, though, what is the relationship be-
tween the psychological processes underlying fused Ameri-
cans’ group identification and their identity fusion as Amer-
icans? Does identity fusion displace group identification
psychologically? Or are the Americans in question simulta-
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neously fused and identified with the group, exhibiting either
some blend of those two conditions or symptoms of one or
the other depending upon the circumstances? If the latter,
what circumstances elicit each, and how does their coexistence
play out in individuals’ mental lives and behavior? White-
house and Lanman’s ensuing comments about obtaining “ex-
tended fusion” by means of nothing more than priming “fa-
milial sentiments,” even among those who have shared
dysphoric experiences, suggest that even if fusion does not
replace group identification, it trumps it, in the ways that
study after study demonstrates that fast intuition trumps slow,
deliberate thought (Kahneman 2011; McCauley 2011). Those
comments also lend some poignancy to questions about the
controls in these studies.
Whitehouse and Lanman state that “what will trigger psy-
chological kinship is the perception that one shares with oth-
ers episodic memories that are essential components of one’s
autobiographical self-concept,” and they especially stress ep-
isodic memories of collective dysphoric experiences. I suspect
that neither claim is airtight. The perception of shared epi-
sodic memories, even of collective dysphoric events, is un-
likely to trigger psychological kinship for the time necessary
to invigorate cooperative communities, let alone altruistic acts
among players, without the support of at least periodic in-
teractions that reinforce those perceptions and of shared nar-
ratives that presume, describe, or exemplify those perceptions.
On the other hand, fulfilling those conditions may render
episodic memories of collective experiences possessing posi-
tive valences comparably effective.
David Shankland
Royal Anthropological Institute, 50 Fitzroy Street, London W1T
5BT, United Kingdom (D.P.Shankland@bristol.ac.uk). 11 V 14
As well as having a great number of stimulating insights, this
rich text provides a window into the way that Whitehouse’s
fascinating ideas have been recently developing. It is equally
interesting in that Whitehouse and Lanman explicitly situate
their article within that historical trend in British anthro-
pology that posits a relationship between social cohesion and
ritual, albeit one that they feel needs to be cast in new ways.
I write then from the perspective of someone who likes
and admires this approach. By way of requesting some modest
clarification, however, I should be interested in ascertaining
the authors’ thoughts on several related issues. The first, and
perhaps most significant, is this. What role are they permitting
causality to hold within their framework? Albeit in a sophis-
ticated way, they characterize the division of social life and
ritual into two broad streams: that which is associated with
doctrinal forms, often part and parcel of proximity with lit-
eracy, governance, and the state, and that more likely to be
imagistic, the latter less integrated into a state system, and
more likely to be associated with the agricultural cycle. I find
this utterly convincing. Where I work in Anatolia, this con-
trast precisely marks the difference between Sunni and Alevi
communities (Shankland 2003). There, Alevi collective rituals
take place only after the harvest is in, and before ploughing
may restart. Just as the authors suggest, the Alevi rituals may
take place only occasionally, and are expensive in time and
money to hold. Contrariwise, the Sunni villages worship rou-
tinely weekly in a mosque, and their ritual calendar has be-
come lunar, always moving out of sequence with the natural
cycle, and exerting domination over it.
Yet, if we look for an underlying cause for this contrast,
economics does not appear to be the answer. Both are typical
peasant communities adopting semitranshumant animal hus-
bandry. In both, the household owns the land that it ploughs,
and very little more. The Alevi communities are rather smaller
and dispersed, and the Sunni bigger and collected together,
but (until modern development and migration became a fac-
tor) equally dependent on subsistence agriculture, and very
little trade. Rather, historically, it would appear that an Alevi
community would flip and convert to becoming Sunni if it
became more proximate to the state. For example, many vil-
lages were said to have converted when the Ottoman Sultan’s
army passed by on an imperial mission to conquer Iran. In
doing so, the Alevis move from a hierarchical system with
hereditary holy men who are mediators within the commu-
nity, to a Sunni system which is egalitarian among men, ac-
cepts the rule of law of the state, but is markedly hierarchical
toward women. The underlying cause, as to whether to move
from one way of life or another, appears to lie in the form
of social order that the villagers adopt, a choice dependent
partly on immediate, local pressure, but also their weighing
up of their place in the wider social unit, whether empire or,
subsequently, nation-state.
Translated back into the immediate claims of the article,
then, this example would imply that the prime cause, that
from which so much else flows, is the means by which a
community achieves social control. Associated with that social
order, reinforcing and congruent with it is a distinct ritual
pattern which resonates with identifiable aspects of human
perception and memory. This presumption would indeed take
us back to African political systems (and to precisely the
distinction which Ibn Khaldoun—cited by the authors—drew
in his great work between Makhzen and Siba). It may serve
as a rival theory to any economic theory that places primacy
on class and the means of production as an underlying ex-
planatory proposition of the forms of social life. My reading
of Whitehouse and Lanman’s paper is therefore that, in
readdressing or revisiting the comparative theory of social
order and culture through their reanalysis of ritual, they are
in fact reinvigorating precisely that area of early structural-
functionalist anthropological thought that has become un-
fashionable, and doing so in a way that forces it to be re-
considered.
This reading may be quite wrong, but I should welcome
the authors’ clarification. In conclusion, I do have two small
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questions. In using the HRAF, are the authors absolutely con-
vinced that the data which they have available to them are
sufficiently robust and nuanced, and that their differentiation
therefore valid? Finally, and this is more personal, I should
be most interested to ascertain whether the authors have met
with praise or skepticism from the wider anthropological
community in presenting this work. Are, in fact, colleagues
able to identify with this approach? Or are responses some-
times uneasy, accusing them of revisiting the ghosts of an-
thropology’s past?
Michael Stausberg
Department of Archaeology, History, Cultural Studies and Religion
(AHKR), University of Bergen, Postboks 7805, 5020 Bergen, Nor-
way (michael.stausberg@ahkr.uib.no). 23 IV 14
Fractionizing or Dichotomizing?
Whitehouse and Lanman start their article by briefly review-
ing the assumption that rituals promote social cohesion.
While defended by an earlier, Durkheimian theoretical tra-
dition, this claim is no longer maintained in contemporary
ritual theory (Brosius, Michaels, and Schrode 2013; Grimes
2014; Kreinath, Snoek, and Stausberg 2006, 2007). The thesis
Whitehouse and Lanman want to make testable, then, is not
a current academic theory of ritual, but a widely reported
nonacademic popular claim, or folk theory—were it not for
the one major contemporary theory of ritual that actually
defends such an argument, but which is curiously not men-
tioned by Whitehouse and Lanman, namely that by Roy A.
Rappaport (1999), for whom ritual is the basic act that
grounds religion and society, and that thereby links humanity
to ecology in an evolutionary scenario of adaptation. So, con-
trary to Whitehouse and Lanman, the ritual creates social
cohesion thesis has not only inspired ethnographic description
but also contributed to current ”scientific theory,” even if this
particular theory may well overstep its mark and ultimately
result in a new variety of theology (Segal 2009), dominated
by an implicit or explicit religious agenda (Wiebe 2004), re-
sulting in the creation of a new “scholarly myth” (Grimes
2014:300).
In order to make the ritual 1 social coherence folk theory
testable, Whitehouse and Lanman suggest that folk categories
need to be fractionated, that is, split “into distinct, empirically
tractable phenomena” with separate causes and effects. The
agenda to demonolithize ritual is indeed part of reflexive the-
orizing (Stausberg 2006). Whitehouse and Lanman paint a
rather optimistic scenario of progress into this direction. It
remains to be seen how far this carries us. For example, the
idea that rituals are causally opaque tends to be formulated
(e.g., by Lagare and Herrmann 2013) in terms of a monothetic
trait that would distinguish ritualistic from nonritualistic ac-
tion per se and thereby remonolithizes the notion of ritual
or ritual action, even though causal opacity may probably be
considered characteristic for all complex social phenomena
(and that is what many rituals are after all). This kind of
theorizing goes against the aim of (reflexive) demonolithizing
the category; yet, Whitehouse and Lanman treat rather spec-
ulative and immature bits of theory such as causal opacity
(or the proposed evolutionary fusion-kin psychology-altruism
complex) as if they already had been established as factual
evidence.
This paper adopts a specific strategy: it fractionizes by di-
chotomizing. Whenever the paper draws distinctions, it sug-
gests two units. Social cohesion is fractioned into either iden-
tity fusion or group identification, memory falls into either
episodic or semantic, self-concepts fall into personal and so-
cial, and there are two “packages” of ritual elements or prac-
tices that are connected to distinct socio-psychological pro-
cesses. The paper extends Whitehouse’s earlier distinction
between imagistic and doctrinal modes (of ritual/religion) to
the following two lines of homologies: imagistic-episodic mem-
ory-shared dysphoria-fusion-sense of psychological kinship and
doctrinal-semantic memory-routinization-identification-ethnic
psychology.
Whitehouse and Lanman claim that both packages amount
to two different evolutionary strategies of coping with dif-
ferent social ecologies, or “resource-acquisition strategies,”
developed by societies (not by people, but drawing on psy-
chological mechanisms) in order to function for their evo-
lutionary survival in a process of group selection. This evo-
lutionary narrative/theory dichotomizes types of rituals and
types of society: there are exactly two of each. For societies,
Whitehouse and Lanman seem to think (they are not crystal
clear here, though) that there are two main ecologies: large-
scale, densely populated societies with largely anonymous
transactions, which developed as the result of the affordances
provided by agriculture (which in turn might have required
new forms of cooperation to develop in the first place), and
small-scale pre-agriculture groups mainly based on direct
transactions. I have two concerns with this: (a) the anthro-
pological record provides a greater evolutionary and socio-
logical variety of scale in societies than two main types only,
so that one is left wondering whether two main types of ritual
packages are really sufficient to serve the needs of the different
types of human societies; and (b) the account seems contra-
dictory on the dimension of persistence/time. On the one
hand, Whitehouse and Lanman argue that the imagistic/dys-
phoric ritual package was no longer needed “to bind together
bands of brothers for the purposes of defense, bride capture,
or hunting,” but on the other hand they refer to contemporary
warfare experiences or other high-risk behavior as part of the
evidence provided for the social-psychological phenomenon
of identity fusion. It would rather seem that facing and coping
with high-risk situations might still make certain forms of
ritual actions more attractive and efficient than others.
This brings me back to ritual. In the scenario outlined by
Whitehouse and Lanman, the ecological needs of enhancing
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cooperation and trust in large-scale agriculture-sustained
densely populated societies can be satisfied by the package
characterized by routinization, the doctrinal mode, authority
figures and artifacts, external mnemonics, and so on. Here
again I would like to address two concerns: (a) even in large-
scale societies kinship persists, and so do kinship-psychology
and related experiences and practices. Accordingly, marriages,
that is, rituals that establish or reaffirm kinship bonds, con-
tinue to affect core aspects of the personal self and often
feature in personal autobiography. So do funerals. Probably
Whitehouse and Lanman will not deny this, but then they
will need to develop a more nested scenario of societal com-
position. And (b) even in (some) societies where one finds
the doctrinal ritual package, there tend to be other types of
ritual practices such as feasts or festivals. These well-known
celebrations are typically characterized by a high degree of
aesthetical pageantry, have ludic qualities and are held in a
subjunctive mode, and enact inversion or reversal, parody
and virtuality (Bell 1997; Grimes 2014; Maurer 2004). Rather
than dichotomizing ritual into two categories, a fuller eco-
logical scenario of societies would probably need to take ac-
count of a broader spectrum of ritual layers, modes, perfor-
mances, or packages.
Dimitris Xygalatas
LEVYNA Laboratory for Experimental Research of Religion, Masa-
ryk University, Jaselska´ 199/16, 602 00 Brno, Czech Republic, and
Interacting Minds Centre, Department of Culture and Society,
Aarhus University, Jens Chr. Skous Vej 3, Build. 1451, DK-8000
Aarhus C, Denmark (xygalatas@mac.com). 24 V 14
Ritual and Cohesion: What Is the Place of
Euphoric Arousal?
In this target article, Whitehouse and Lanman present “a
general and testable theory of the relationship between ritual,
cohesion, and cooperation.” They frame their theory in terms
of empirically verifiable hypotheses by fractionating key con-
cepts like “ritual” and “cohesion” and examining the rela-
tionship between certain of their constituent parts. This is an
admirable and ambitious undertaking and an approach that
constitutes a welcome contribution to ritual studies, a sub-
discipline which has been known for neither the precision
nor the testability of its claims. Although I agree with much
of the overarching argument and most of the specific hy-
potheses put forward, I worry that the breadth required by a
general theory is often at odds with the narrow focus of a
fractionating strategy, which is by definition selective. One
example of this clash is related to “dysphoria,” which is the
most discussed concept in this paper.
The authors talk of two culturally evolved modes of ritual
cohesion, which they call the “imagistic” and “doctrinal”
mode. More specifically, they argue that highly dysphoric
arousal (and low frequency) in the imagistic mode works to
induce a feeling of psychological kinship among participants,
while frequent repetition (and low arousal) in the doctrinal
mode results in a qualitatively distinct type of cohesion which
they call “group identification.” What immediately strikes me
about this dichotomy is the conspicuous absence of euphoric
rituals, which are cross-culturally abundant and possibly more
common than dysphoric ones. Why do the authors choose
to restrict the scope of the model to dysphoric arousal? No
reason is provided for that omission, and the cited literature
only relates to dysphoric arousal, which is not to say that
euphoric rituals could not have similar effects.
To the contrary, Whitehouse’s own research (Atkinson and
Whitehouse 2011) suggests a very similar pattern for euphoric
and dysphoric rituals (e.g., both are inversely correlated with
ritual frequency, although more so for dysphoric rituals). Fur-
thermore, while cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) and
costly signaling (Sosis 2003) might play an important role in
strengthening cohesion and cooperation (as the authors ac-
knowledge), different psychological processes like excitation
transfer (Zillmann 1983) may operate with similar results in
euphoric rituals.
After all, wedding ceremonies, possibly the most universal
of all rituals (so much that their existence is a typical pre-
requisite for legal recognition as a religion), are also among
the most euphoric ones. In addition, they are among the most
memorable, infrequently performed and highly arousing ex-
periences, which are precisely designed to establish formal
and enduring kinship relationships—in fact so compelling
that many contemporary incest laws ban sexual relations or
marriage between fictive (step) relatives. Should we not expect
such rituals to play a major role in promoting social cohesion?
And if the authors are willing to exclude weddings and bap-
tisms, enthronements and coronations, collective singing and
dancing, Catholic fiestas, Chinese spring festivals and Hindu
rituals of light—not to speak of secular events like sports
competitions, parades, concerts—and numerous other highly
arousing and entertaining collective rituals from their model,
are we indeed dealing with a general theory of ritual and
social dynamics, or with a more restricted theory of ritual
dysphoria?
If the authors wish to argue for a special role for dysphoria
(which is of course their prerogative), and given their call for
testable predictions, I would urge them to conduct studies
comparing the effects of euphoric and dysphoric rituals on
cohesion. This in itself is not an easy task, as there is no
perfect measure of dysphoria and euphoria (not to mention
cohesion). Traditional anthropological research has relied on
a combination of firsthand phenomenological accounts of
participants and secondhand subjective judgments derived
from anthropologists themselves; quantitative historical stud-
ies have used thirdhand judgments obtained from indepen-
dent raters (Atkinson and Whitehouse 2011), while more bi-
ological approaches have examined participants’ physiological
responses (Xygalatas et al. 2011). Yet, not only is there no
Whitehouse and Lanman Ritual, Fusion, and Identification 17
Friday Oct 03 2014 02:16 PM/CA301816/2014/55/6/kfoster2/bjc///ms to editorial/1002/use-graphics/narrow/default/
consensus on the precedence or one method over the others
for determining the emotional quality of ritual experiences,
but their respective results can often be contradictory. For
example, performers of the kavadi ritual in Mauritius scream
and shed tears of agony as they are pierced with needles and
skewers, but upon being asked, they typically deny having felt
any dysphoria. Physiological measurements of painful rituals
have shown extreme levels of arousal while the performers
themselves might be oblivious to those states (Xygalatas et al.
2013a) or even experience the event as pleasant (Fischer et
al. 2014). Furthermore, the same event can have radically
divergent emotional quality for different types of participants
based on their ritual role, bringing pleasure to some and
suffering to others (Bulbulia et al. 2013).
Methodological issues aside, the matter can only be resolved
empirically. The challenges outlined above do mean that the
authors have a tough climb if they are willing to pursue this
path. But in my view, this is a path worth climbing, as it
might allow them to enrich and expand their current model.
Reply
We feel very fortunate to have received several well-argued
and thought-provoking commentaries and would like to
thank all for their contributions. In our paper we attempted
to summarize a substantial body of collaborative research
involving scores of scholars and scientists over more than two
decades. We argued that it is possible to test numerous the-
ories of “ritual,” including the theory that it can and often
does produce social cohesion, by fractionating both “ritual”
and “cohesion.” We also argued that there is evidence in the
archaeological, historical, and ethnographic records of a ten-
dency for collective rituals to come in one of two distinctive
“ritual packages” that serve as cultural adaptations to distinct
resource-acquisition problems. Along with many generous re-
marks on our efforts, some of the commentaries suggested
that our account was too simple, raised unanswered questions,
and neglected alternative perspectives. We respond to these
criticisms in turn.
Several commentaries argued that our account did not do
justice to the complexity of “ethnographic reality” or the con-
nections between personal and social selves (Lende), memory
(Downey, Fredman and Swann), or the “fuller ecological sce-
nario of societies” (Stausberg). Our overall response is as
follows. Explanations of cross-cultural and historical patterns,
while being implicit in the work of nearly all anthropologists,
are often found to be overly simple and even irrelevant by
those who are more focused on understanding the ethno-
graphic reality of particular case studies. This is not so much
a criticism of a proposed explanation as a declaration of dif-
ferent interests. An explanation of a trend in ritual packages
and social forms is not a deterministic claim about particular
cases. Moreover, an explanation of a trend is not meant to
be an exhaustive explanation of a whole domain. For example,
Lende comments that we present a simple, dichotomous ap-
proach to understanding how people feel connected with non-
kin. It was not our aim to give a comprehensive account of
all the types of connections people might feel toward others
but to explain a trend in these connections throughout time
and across cultures. Only if one of the other types of human
connection were in some way responsible for the trend we
are attempting to explain would this criticism be valid.
Some commentaries suggested that our account of the role
of memory in group alignment was too simple. We proposed
that episodic and semantic memory underwrite fusion and
identification respectively, but according to Downey these two
systems of memory are “intertwined” and “overlap.” What
remains unclear, though, is how any intertwining and over-
lapping would affect our main argument that shared episodic
memory can lead to fusion and psychological kinship while
semantic memory for normative beliefs and practices under-
writes social identity and ethnic psychology. Would a more
nuanced account of the relationship between episodic and
semantic memory have substantive consequences for our ar-
gument or merely demonstrate greater mastery of the memory
literature? Fredman and Swann suggest the former when they
argue that even if shared episodic memories lead to fusion,
the same could be true of shared semantic memories. It is an
interesting point and well taken: could sharing a historical
narrative about the group, for example, motivate fusion in
much the same way as sharing lived experiences with the
group? This question would need to be resolved empirically,
but in the absence of experimental evidence our hunch is that
historical narratives are more likely to motivate identification
rather than fusion with the group. Since historical narratives
are acquired through the testimony of others rather than
through personal experience, they activate the social but not
the personal self, whereas a hallmark of fusion is that it ac-
tivates both together.
Similarly, Lende argues that our psychology as a whole is
too simple, citing a study by Roth and Steffens (2014) showing
that “associative self anchoring” plays an important role in
group identification and that, consequently, our claim of a
separation between personal and social selves is undermined.
We never argued, however, that the personal self is not in-
volved in any way in group identification. Rather, we argued
that (1) following a substantial body of literature on social
identity and social categorization theory, there is a “hydraulic
relationship” between the personal and social selves in terms
of their activation at any particular time (Levine and Crowther
2008; Turner et al. 1987) and (2) there is an important dif-
ference between a personal self-concept being merely “in-
volved” or connected to a social identity in some way (which
nearly all work in social psychology shows) and a social iden-
tity becoming an essential component of a personal self-con-
cept. This difference has major consequences for our expla-
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nation of the historical trend in ritual packages and social
forms.
As well as comments suggesting more nuanced versions of
our argument, several commentaries raised broader issues that
they thought our paper neglected or excluded. For example,
both Lende and Xygalatas wondered why we devoted so little
consideration to the role of euphoria in rituals and its effects
on group bonding. Stausberg echoed this point and also
pointed out that some rituals are neither doctrinal nor im-
agistic, and what of those? In fairness, we are not attempting
to present a theory of all phenomena that have been tradi-
tionally labeled “rituals” but nor are we in principle opposed
to studying euphoric rituals. Indeed, we are currently in the
midst of exploring the effects of both euphoria and synchrony
in ritual settings hypothesizing that both can temporarily in-
crease fusion and identification without producing the lasting
effects on fusion associated with shared dysphoria. Yet, since
we do not see any evidence or analysis suggesting that eu-
phoria can explain the historical trends we focus on in our
paper, we set that topic aside.
McCauley also raised a host of searching queries about the
nature of identity fusion, some of which are addressed in a
wider literature that we cited and chose not to discuss in any
detail, such as how fusion is measured (via a validated 7-item
scale) and whether it displaces group identification (it does
not; Gomez et al. 2011) and how participants were recruited
for a study concerning responses to the Boston Marathon
bombings (via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk) (Buhrmester et
al., forthcoming). McCauley also asks whether particular cir-
cumstances might differentially elicit the effects of group iden-
tification and fusion with a given identity. Swann and col-
leagues (2010b) have provided evidence that personal arousal
triggers the effects of fusion but not identification on self-
sacrifice (as there is a weaker connection between the personal
and social selves in group identification). They had Spanish
participants in three separate studies exercise before com-
pleting scales on willingness to fight and die for Spain or
make donations to a fund for needy Spaniards. Arousal level
interacted with fusion to increase endorsements of extreme
pro-group behavior and donations while no such interaction
with identification was found, suggesting again that for fused
individuals, there is an especially strong relation between the
personal self and the social self.
Another question that at least one commentator thought
was raised but not answered by our paper was: What causes
a group to adopt doctrinal or imagistic dynamics? According
to Shankland, the answer appears not to lie in economic
factors. When comparing imagistic Alevi and the doctrinal
Sunni groups in Anatolia, Shankland observes that both prac-
tice semitranshumant animal husbandry and there is little to
distinguish the two communities in terms of wealth, class, or
other economic features. Shankland’s preferred explanation
is that people decide whether to adopt a doctrinal or imagistic
system based on “immediate, local pressure, but also their
weighing up of their place in the wider social unit, whether
empire or, subsequently, nation-state.” This strikes us as plau-
sible (although more precision and detail would be needed
to evaluate the claim), but it also pushes back the question
of why we have doctrinal and imagistic modes in the first
place.
Our argument is that the modes emerge as ways of ad-
dressing different kinds of collective action problems neces-
sary for survival. To the extent that they succeed, the cultural
groups adopting these practices flourish. Does that make us
old-fashioned functionalists, as Shankland asks? Yes, but with
a difference. We see the connection between resource-acqui-
sition strategies and ritual packages as a matter of selectionist
rather than mechanistic causation. We do not claim that a
society adopting a particular resource-extraction strategy will
automatically adopt a functionally adaptive mode of religi-
osity. It is perfectly possible that our selectionist account of
ritual trends is correct but that the case of Alevi and Sunni
groups in Anatolia bucks these trends.
Another critical response to our paper was that it neglected
alternative explanations for dysphoric rituals. Fredman and
Swann, for example, while accepting our grounds for rejecting
dissonance theory as a sufficient explanation for dysphoric
initiations, nevertheless argued that other consistency theories
are not so easily dismissed. Applying Heider’s (1960) “balance
theory,” they observe: “To resolve the inconsistency created
by the positive valence toward the elder and negative valence
toward the dysphoric ritual behaviors, the actor decides that
enduring a bit of anguish is worthwhile because the group is
so worthwhile.” It is not clear exactly what is being explained
here, however. If it is the decision of the initiate to endure
anguish, then a more compelling explanation, consistent with
our theories, presents itself: the initiates participate because
of coercion (in many traditional societies, failure to submit
would have meant summary execution). Nor is it clear that
regarding the group (or the anguish required to join it) as
worthwhile should help to resolve the dissonance occasioned
by liking the tormentor while hating the torment. In principle,
though, we regard consistency explanations (including dis-
sonance theory) to be potentially valid and complementary
perspectives rather than stark alternatives to our own ap-
proach.
Fredman and Swann also wonder if our explanation of
dysphoric rituals is overly focused on the psychological effects
of participating in the role of patient. They ask whether it
might be equally productive to focus on those who conduct
and oversee the rituals. We agree that this would be an in-
teresting and complimentary perspective and something to
consider in future empirical research.
As Lende pointed out, yet another approach that we could
have considered is the love-of-the-oppressor paradigm as-
sociated with so-called Stockholm Syndrome. Again, this is
an interesting point although our primary concern has been
to explain the bonding that occurs among coparticipants
rather than with a leader figure. The latter may or may not
be a feature of imagistic rituals—indeed in many cases the
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focus is much more on the ordeal itself (e.g., walking on hot
coals, removal of the foreskin) rather than on those who
conduct or facilitate it. Indeed, initiators—if they have any
role at all in carrying out dypshoric procedures—may be
masked and anonymous. This is not to rule out the possibility
of Stockholm Syndrome being at play in some dysphoric rit-
uals, but it cannot serve as a general theory of dysphoric rituals
in the same way that we are attempting to provide.
In general, we found little to disagree with in the com-
mentaries and, quite the opposite, plan to draw on the many
helpful suggestions and observations they provided as we pro-
gress with our empirical research. Nevertheless, there was one
criticism in Stausberg’s commentary that we would particu-
larly wish to parry. Stausberg appears to believe that the idea
that rituals can and often do produce social cohesion is a
“popular folk theory” rather than a “current academic theory”
and that “current academic theories” are necessarily better
than “popular folk ones.” We disagree. First, this would be a
small “academy” indeed, as the theory that collective rituals
produce social cohesion is present throughout both the social
and cognitive anthropology of religion, including not only
the numerous social and cognitive anthropologists and psy-
chologists mentioned in our paper, but also in several of the
contributions (e.g., Harth, Rao, and Bloch) to the volume
Stausberg references as representative of “contemporary ritual
theory” (Kreinath et al. 2006). Second, Stausberg seems to be
under the mistaken impression that claims about rituals pro-
ducing social cohesion are necessarily deterministic claims
asserting that such effects will be plain to see in every context
no matter what other forces are at work, such as “how par-
ticipation is negotiated and subordination resisted” (Rao
2006:151). This is a misunderstanding of causal claims. Few
hypothesized effects in the human sciences are thought always
to overpower the innumerable other causal effects in partic-
ular circumstances. Rather, nearly all claims are ceteris paribus
claims about the influence of a single or small group of factors
(e.g., dysphoria, synchronic movement, causal opacity).
Third, whether a theory comes from a popular or academic
source has precisely zero relevance to its truth value, which
can only be ascertained by evidence and analysis. That said,
we reiterate our thanks to all the commentators, who provided
new evidence and analysis to consider in our ongoing efforts
to advance the scientific understanding of ritual and its causes
and consequences.
—Harvey Whitehouse and Jonathan A. Lanman
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